It is now a week since I trudged through the snow to deliver a lecture with sleep and disbelief in my eyes after staying up much of the night watching the US election results come in. That morning, my thoughts revolved around the election of Trump and how to explain this as part of my lecture on Neo-Marxist approaches to International Relations. I hope I did a reasonable job in the circumstances and in the days that followed I gave various media interviews, wrote blogs and gave a public presentation on the topic.
In the immediate aftermath of political ‘convulsions’ it is perhaps inevitable that we explain them using the tools we have immediately to hand. To a significant extent the New Politics of Inequality thesis that I have been working with does help to understand these political convulsions, and suggests that more will occur in the years to come.
However, both Brexit and the Trump elections are convulsions whose internal dimensions require more detailed and careful examination. It seems to me that some of the questions that many of us have been asking in the post-convulsion period, in both cases, are not fully answered using the existing analytical tools at our disposal.
For example, why did so many women vote for a man who appears to openly admit to sexual assault and incredibly sexist views? Similarly, why did some Latino voters support a man who wanted to curtail the opportunities to move to the United States for people like them? Perhaps a bigger question which applies to both the Brexit and Trump convulsions is: why is it that challenges associated with globalisation and the effects of competitiveness are popularly understandable via a regressive politics of seeking out past securities and xenophobia, in the face of the paucity of evidence that such politics can pose a solution for the problems?
In the wake of the Trump election it has been commonplace to suggest that in combination with Brexit, the rise of populism elsewhere and challenging geo-politics involving Russia threaten to unravel the global liberal order. Many have suggested that there are parallels with the circumstances of the inter-war period. The worry is that these circumstances mirror those that created the fertile ground for extremism and conflictual nationalisms to develop. The parallels are certainly there and these concerns are apposite: Nazism didn’t start with gas chambers and concentration camps, it started with poverty, insecurity and widespread anxiety about how to resolve these problems, which was then exploited by opportunist populist leaders via regressive ideology.
Another – more intellectual – parallel is perhaps also appropriate. In comparable yet different terms both Antonio Gramsci and the early members of the so called ‘Frankfurt’ school both struggled to come to terms with the rightward shift in popular opinion which saw Fascist leaders gain widespread support. Both camps sought to explain why the development of an alienating industrial capitalism that Marx had predicted accurately in economic terms, did not lead to the types of solidaristic and internationally oriented working class consciousness he anticipated, and instead led to nationalism and fascism. Both stressed the role of ideology, the ways in which collective and individual psychologies obscured the material reality from being popularly understood.
Perhaps both Gramscian and Frankfurt school ideas offer us a way of understanding the present. Hegemonic institutions of the extended state, the culture industry and so on embed the power relations of the status quo in our common sense, produce ‘false consciousness’ and create the conditions for simplistic and regressive understandings of our collective insecurities.
But, if these tools are able to help us understand the current conjecture then we are surely in need of new and detailed applications of them. Such applications must be central to the development of a progressive counter-movement to the rise of right-wing populism, with any chance of success. It clearly is not enough to fall back on a defence of the post-war liberal settlement that got us to where we are. Instead, it is surely better to try to understand why the popular consensus in support of that settlement has fallen apart.
My sense is that the New Politics of Inequality thesis takes us some way along that path. It helps understand the causes of poverty, inequality and insecurity and that this may realise a popular backlash to globalisation or European integration. It helps to understand why in conditions of precarity and precarious lives, there is fertile ground for regressive political ideologies in relation to immigration, race, gender and so on.
But it does not explain why and how regressive ideas take hold in terms that Gramscian notions of hegemony or Frankfurt school understandings of collective psychology would identify. Further, it doesn’t help us understand the terms on which an alternative progressive ideology might be constructed, beyond the rather trite observation that progressive and effective political leadership and more complex popular understandings are necessary.
In other words, to recall many of the debates between academic colleagues that I have seen on social media over the last week: while the working class vote for Trump or Brexit might be explained via some kind of notion of ‘false consciousness’ or women voting for Trump might be the product of patriarchy and internalised misogyny, neither explanation seems on its own sufficient or wholly effective.
It is necessary to better understand now, how and why people comprehend their circumstances in ways that are supportive of regressive political ideas. Current research on these issues is necessary because it is surely the case that the detailed ways they work is dynamic over time and space. So if Frankfurt school research on the Nazi period did help to understand that, we need new research now to focus on how and why regressive, xenophobic and divisive political agendas are taking hold. Colleagues like Owen Worth, Stuart Shields, David Bailey and Ian Bruff I know have begun to tackle these issues in different contexts, but I am sure that they themselves would agree that more detailed understanding is still required.
I don’t immediately have the answers to these challenges. So perhaps to advance our thinking we need to marry some of the very well developed tools of public opinion research (albeit recognising the problems of atomisation and aggregation) with the critical theoretical perspective outlined by Horkheimer (and later derived from Gramsci’s work by Robert Cox) and material analysis of the production and reproduction of inequality in different national and local contexts subject to world market integration.
It is these things that will shape my thinking as I continue to try to make sense of contemporary political convulsions. I might even be able to put them into practice. If anyone reading has any ideas on how best to do this, then please do get in touch!
Last night I spoke at a very well attended event at Leeds University on the international implications of Brexit, and, in the context of this week’s events, of a Trump presidency also. Others on the panel were Adrian Favell (who spoke about the significant risks to cosmopolitanism in Europe), Roxana Babulescu (who spoke about the dynamics of immigration and immigration policy in the UK) and Gary Dymski (who spoke about asymmetries in financial embedded and regulation, alongside international competition).
My own presentation was a slightly reoriented version of yesterday’s blog post. The presentations and discussion were lively and informative. Like much of the media commentary on the implications of a Trump presidency today, a lot of the discussion turned on a shared concern about the democratic implications of the Trump election result alongside the Brexit referendum result.
While this sentiment was pretty widely shared, this post is motivated by a current in the discussion that I was more uncomfortable with. It seemed to me that several of the contributions from the speakers and audience had an implicit or explicit desire to move back to the liberal institutional compromise of the post-war period. That desirability seemed to be informed by a sense that such a change might be possible.
I want to argue here first that the political economy of that post-war compromise might appear to be worth fighting for on the surface, but in fact that compromise was not so desirable and rested on significant exploitation that was integral to it. Second, even if this was not the case, a return to the domestic political economy that was embedded in the post-war compromise is not now possible.
There was clearly much that was desireable about the post-War political economy. High levels of employment, relatively stable growth, rising wages and consumption offered steadily rising living standards and greater opportunities for leisure. What was less desirable however is that it relied on free or cheap inputs on a massive scale, and those inputs were provided by women, an unequal trading relation with the rest of the world and the unsustainable use of fossil fuels. The post-War political economy was desirable in some respects then, but relied on exploitative social relations to underpin the privileged position of Unionised labour in the then advanced industrial countries. Cosy liberal social democracy was not so cosy for those who provided its foundations.
Second, even if the post-war system did not have those downsides, it is in any case not possible to return to it. This is precisely because the competitive position of the US/UK/western Europe has been eroded. It is also because, as is now widely acknowledged, neo-liberalisation has undermined the conditions for the high levels of growth necessary to sustain that model. Offshoring, the replacement of labour by capital and state-induced wage reductions and upward redistribution have all also undermined the bargaining position of Unionised labour and, consequently, Unionisation itself has declined. Many of the institutional conditions of the post-war order that gave it its desireable characteristics have been eroded or replaced. Given the path-dependency of social change, it just isn’t likely that those can be reclaimed.
These two arguments do not lead to particularly palatable conclusions, it is true. They suggest that the institutions of the post-War liberal compromise were themselves inherently related to where we are now, in terms of challenges to liberal democracy that we are now experiencing. They also suggest that the future looks considerably less bright than any rose tinted view of the past.
Whether or not these conclusions are comforting though, is less important than ensuring that political counter-movements to the kind of insular and divisive politics of manipulated anxiety about the future represented by Brexit/Trump, are based on a credible understanding of the past and present. Without that, I fear that political counter-movements – like the New Democrats/New Labour as counters to Reagan/Thatcher – will only kick the problem down the road, exacerbating and amplifying its negative implications.
There are to be more post-Brexit open forums like last night’s – it was an informed and informative discussion; if you can get along, do!
Yesterday I posted about the US Presidential Election and suggested that whatever happened the support for Trump constituted a political ‘convulsion’, in a similar way to the Brexit referendum result.
My basic thesis in terms of the New Politics of Inequality is that inequalities that have arisen as a consequence of neo-liberalisation, are increasingly recognised by communities who are becoming anxious and insecure about their socio-economic futures, both for them and their children. This is creating a sense of disenfranchisement with politics and political institutions, and fuelling anti-establishment politics, extra-parliamentary political movements and new political parties.
These insecurities are located in universal processes of world market integration which increase international competitiveness. Much is up for grabs here in terms of how economic insecurities are explained via different cultural politics.
On the one hand rightwing-populism appears to exploit economic insecurities as fear of social and cultural change, and in particular to place the blame on immigrants. Voters with anxieties about economic futures might have already faced the costs of adjusting to globalisation, but they may also be relatively affluent and concerned about the prospects for their children. This partly explains why the Republican party in the US now seems to be the party of the relatively poor.
On the other hand, leftist populism seems to focus on the insecurities of the relatively skilled workers who find benefits in a more cosmopolitan society and greater diversity. In part this explains the high skill profile of Brexit remainers and anti-Trump voters in the US. It is also partly the reason why the Democrats are becoming the party of the rich.
The main ‘convulsions’ seem to result from the success of politicians in manipulating right-wing populism, seeking to ‘take back control’ in the case of Brexit or ‘make our country great again’ in the case of the US. But these convulsions are somewhat against the tide of history, in several respects.
First, they are against the trend of world market integration. In terms of UK, constraints on sovereignty are as much, or more, related to its free trade commitments as wider aspects of European integration. Leaving the EU while maintaining access to the single market is unlikely to claim back much sovereignty, but appears a likely outcome of the Brexit negotiations. Similarly, voters supporting Trump’s calls to renegotiate free trade deals might also find that this is easier to say and harder to achieve.
What’s more, while free trade has led to increased competitiveness and the loss of jobs in traditional industries, undoing those deals might merely accentuate the problem for those same families and communities who might then be faced with further job losses, rising consumer prices and more economic insecurity.
It is easy for politicians to stoke up these sentiments for a quick political win, but it will prove much harder to actually deliver for those communities. In both the US and the UK, the really worrying aspect of the Trump victory and Brexit result might be that the ‘cry of anger’ that underpins them will not be met with beneficial change. Indeed, they may well be worse off still as a result. Whatever, voters in the US or UK may want, international competition is only likely to increase.
Second, the demographic tide of history is also against these convulsions. Those watching the TV coverage from the US overnight or early this morning will have been struck by the degree of demographic change in the country. When Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980 88% of voters were white. This year 70% were white. Courting white voters may work for now, but there is a ticking clock on that strategy. Similarly, like support for Scottish independence and remaining in the EU, support for Hilary was much higher among the young, and those not quite yet able to exercise a vote. Supporters of the ‘take back control’/’make our country great again’ claims to the past are on the wrong side of inevitable change.
None of that should read as comfort. These convulsions are against the tide of history, but they are characterised by division, aggression and scapegoating of particular communities. To some extent these convulsions are about communities trying to cling to an imagined past. When those same groups find that the tide of history is not turned by their pyrrhic victories, the scope for further division and conflict will surely only increase.
Convulsions now, may then breed the conditions for further convulsions in the future.
In that context, and as Sophia Price argues in a companion post to this one, left politicians and parties need to better understand the ways that culture, race, gender and other identities intersect with class. These intersections shape the ways in which increasing international competition might be understood.
For several decades political parties have sought to respond to the tastes of median voters. This has often meant that they court, rather than reshape political anxieties – such as in responses to populist – and often ill-informed – understandings of welfare or immigration. In place of this, left parties seeking progressive responses to competition and insecurity need to meet these challenges head on, offer alternative explanations and unpick the easy sound-bite politics of the right-populists.
That’s no easy task, but the alternative is pretty bleak.
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